This study investigates the direct incidence of the corporate income tax (CIT) through wage bargaining, using an industry-region level panel dataset on all corporations in Germany over the period 1998-2006. For the first time we account for employment effects which result from tax-induced wage changes. Workers share in reductions of the CIT burden; yet, the net effect of wage bargaining on the corporate wage bill, after an exogenous €1 decrease in the CIT burden, is as little as 19-28 cents. This is about half of the effect obtained in prior literature focussing on wages alone. JEL classification: H22, H25, J21, J31, H32.
INTRODUCTION
Who effectively bears the burden of the corporate income tax (CIT)? This question is addressed by the economic incidence of the CIT, which is a central issue in tax policy, as it determines the distributional effects of the tax system. For many policy-makers, the CIT is not only an important source of government income but also offers the opportunity to increase the progressivity of the tax system. This view, however, only holds true if the tax burden is effectively borne by capital owners and not shifted on to workers (or consumers). Despite its policy relevance, no consensus about the economic size of corporate tax incidence has been achieved. To date, the distributional effects of CIT reforms remain unclear, as the matter about who effectively bears the burden of the CIT has not been settled academically.
The literature distinguishes two pathways through which the CIT can be passed on to labour: indirect and direct incidence. Indirect incidence refers to tax effects working through the level of pretax profits, determined by investment and by output prices. The literature on indirect incidence goes back to Harberger (1962) . Using a simple general equilibrium model of a closed economy with two competitive sectors, a corporate and a non-corporate sector, he showed that capital owners in both sectors bear the full burden of taxes on capital in the corporate sector. Several subsequent studies have extended the model to account for more sectors, dynamics, uncertainty and imperfect competition (for a review, see Auerbach, 2005) . Altogether, these models suggest that capital bears a substantial part, if not all, of the tax burden.
Neglecting the general equilibrium effects stressed by the Harberger model, recent empirical studies have focused on wage effects of corporate taxes through wage bargaining (direct incidence). With collective bargaining, corporate taxes can be shifted on to labour as corporate taxes reduce the quasi-rent over which employers and workers can bargain, conditional on the level of pretax profits. Arulampalam et al. (2012) were the first to identify direct incidence. Studying corporations in nine European countries they find that about half of a tax increase is passed on to wages in the long run. This estimate is for the wage effect only; adjustments in employment in response to changes in the wage rate are neglected. Using similar empirical methodologies, Hassett et al. (2006) and Desai et al. (2007) for the US, and aus dem Moore et al. (2014) , Bauer et al. (2012) and Fuest et al. (2016) for Germany report similar estimates of direct wage incidence.
This paper makes three novel contributions to the small literature on direct incidence of corporate taxes: First, our analysis sheds light on CIT incidence in environments with collective wage bargaining at branch or sectoral level, which is applicable for most continental European countries (OECD 2004) . Our panel dataset at the industry-region level combines comprehensive CIT return and Social Security payroll information for the universe of German corporations and their employees during the period 1998-2006. 1 The panel dataset is rich in labour market variables and tax information. It enables us to fully exploit the heterogeneity in industries' tax burdens and thus in their conditions for collective wage bargaining.
Second, in contrast to studies that use cross sectional and time variation in the statutory rate of the local business tax in Germany (as, e.g., in Fuest et al., 2016) , we use exogenous variation in the effective corporate tax burden to identify tax incidence. The change in effective corporate tax burdens varies across industry-region units of observation and over time because of two major CIT reforms in Germany during our observation period: the Tax Relief Act in 2001 and the Tax Preference Reduction Act in 2004 (see Section 5.1).
We measure the tax burden using average tax rates (ATR). The ATR is the average share of pretax profits that tax authorities take away, curtailing the pie over which employers and workers can bargain. As the ATR is likely endogenous with regard to wage rate decisions, we instrument the ATR with a counterfactual ATR derived from a microsimulation model (as proposed in Gruber and Saez, 2002) . Thus, we identify tax incidence exclusively based on exogenous within-country variation in the CIT burden (and then relate changes in the ATR to changes in the statutory CIT, which is the variable policy-makers can directly decide upon).
1. The German studies mentioned above refer to, respectively, changes in business taxation between 1998 and 2001 (aus dem Moore et al., 2014) and to the local business tax (Bauer et al., 2012; Fuest et al., 2016) which is levied not only on corporations but also on other business forms except the self-employed.
Third, unlike the studies on direct wage incidence mentioned in the introduction, we introduce effects of the CIT on employment by allowing labour demand to respond to the wage rate and account for this effect in the calculation of wage incidence. A change in the wage rate triggers a movement along the labour demand curve. We argue that movements along the demand curve were most likely to occur in Germany during our observation period, as wage negotiations largely followed the right-to-manage framework: Worker representatives and employers Nash-bargained over the wage rate, with firms retaining the right to subsequently adjust their workforce (Nickell and Andrews, 1983) . After a tax cut, it might have been that worker representatives interested in higher wages (and not in adding new employees) negotiated a large increase in wage rates. However, firms might have undone part of the increase in total wage costs by laying some of their workers off. When determining tax effects on the corporate wage bill it is thus essential to take into account employment decisions, as an imminent consequence of the wage bargaining process. Our empirical framework reflects the institutional setting in our observation period and allows us to calculate the net tax effect of wage bargaining on the corporate wage bill.
Overall, a tax cut might well spur employment: A shift of the labour demand curve may increase employment and (over)compensate the unambiguously negative employment effect caused by the movement along the labour demand curve described above. Such a shift of the labour demand curve is caused by a reduction in (marginal) CIT rates, which lowers the user cost of capital and enhances capital formation. As a larger capital stock allows greater economic output, a CIT cut can increase overall employment (scale effect). This positive scale effect is what policy-makers have in mind when they call for cuts in CIT rates in order to spur employment. Tax-related changes in capital formation and output impact the level of pretax profits; they are part of indirect incidence and not the focus of our study. However, to put our employment effects estimated for direct incidence into perspective, we also report estimates for the number of additional employees that can be ascribed to greater capital stock.
We provide empirical evidence that it is crucial to take employment effects into account when calculating direct CIT incidence. Our central estimates show that workers share in reductions of the CIT burden, although direct incidence is small: Wage bargaining, after an exogenous €1 decrease in the CIT burden, effectively increases the corporate wage bill by as little as 19-28 cents. This is about half of the effect obtained in prior literature under the assumption that employment remained constant. Using our dataset and ignoring any wage-related changes in employment, we reproduce the estimates found in prior literature for Germany, for example, in the recent study on the local business tax by Fuest et al. (2016) . A comparison of direct incidence between estimations with and without employment responses confirms that merely focussing on wages leads to an overestimation of direct tax incidence.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the institutional background of wage bargaining in Germany and introduce the right-tomanage model underlying our analysis. Section 3 describes how we calculate the share of the CIT burden shifted on to labour. Section 4 introduces our industryregion level panel dataset. Section 5 presents our identification strategy and the empirical model. Section 6 presents the results, and Section 7 concludes.
WAGE BARGAINING IN GERMANY
This section details the institutional and theoretical foundations of our analysis of direct CIT incidence. We briefly describe the institutional background of wage bargaining in Germany, introduce the right-to-manage framework and discuss how this framework is reflected in our empirical estimations.
There are several important features of the wage bargaining process prevalent in Germany during our observation period. First, Germany is similar to other continental European countries in that wages are predominantly bargained at the industry level. It differs from the United States or Japan, where wages are usually bargained at the level of the individual firm, and it differs from the Nordic countries, where national unions and employer associations engage in interindustry bargaining at the national level (OECD 2004) .
Second, because of high collective bargaining coverage in Germany, wage rates are subject to union-negotiated terms to a large extent. According to Ellguth and Kohaut (2014) , two out of three employees in West Germany and more than half of all employees in East Germany were covered by a collective bargaining agreement in the mid-1990s. Collective bargaining coverage has been declining since then, in particular in East Germany, but seems to have stabilized in recent years. In 2004, about 60 (40) per cent of all employees in West (East) Germany were still covered by a collective bargaining agreement. Coverage overall as well as the relative importance of contracts set at the industry and firm level vary substantially among industries and by region.
Third, although the outcome of the wage settlement is negotiated between unions and the regional employers' association, it usually also covers non-union members. Collective agreements are legally only binding for members of the negotiating parties but it has become common practice to extend the wage agreement to a firm's total workforce, whether unionized or not. Although in some industries, in East Germany in particular, a large share of employees is not formally covered by a collective bargaining agreement, a large share of firms nevertheless seems to set wages in accordance with collective bargaining agreements existing in the respective industry ( Table 2 in Ellguth and Kohaut, 2014) . The reasons for these extensions are various and include the principle of equal treatment and the intention to not indirectly promote unionization (for a discussion of the reasons, see Fitzenberger and Franz, 1999) . Because of extension, coverage by collective agreements does not depend on individual union membership in Germany.
Fourth, in our observation period 1998À2006, we saw an increase in real wage rates, which was accompanied by a decline in employment. Overall unemployment persisted at a high level, which had no apparent impact on the wage bargaining process, at least within our observation period. 2 All of these institutional characteristics suggest that wages and employment in Germany may be explained by the so-called right-to-manage model (see, e.g., Cahuc et al., 2004; Layard et al., 1991) . In the right-to-manage model (RTM), 2. This seems to have changed only recently in the wake of increased international competition through the introduction of employment protection clauses in union wage contracts (for some institutional background, see Addison et al., 2007). wage rates are subject to collective Nash-bargaining, while firms remain free to unilaterally choose employment once wage rates have been set. 3 Worker representatives in the RTM are supposed to be utilitarian and thus to maximize the expected utility of each worker, knowing that the employer retains the right to fire randomly chosen employees if labour demand falls below the number of employed persons. Employers take the negotiated wage rate as given and maximize profits by choosing their number of employees. The collective bargaining process in the RTM has three important implications on the level of employment. First, wage rates in industries characterized by high levels of bargaining coverage may be set above the competitive level and may be partly determined by the sharing of quasi-rents. G€ urtzgen (2009) finds some evidence for rent sharing in West German mining and manufacturing industries, and Hirsch and Schnabel (2014) report indirect evidence on the degree and evolution of union bargaining power in the German economy which seems to support the RTM model. Given the implications of the RTM model as applied to the German labour market, we expect wage rates to rise and employment to fall after a cut in the CIT burden. 4 Second, worker representatives negotiate inefficiently high wage rates, accepting unemployment as their preferences vary between wage rates and employment (see, e.g., Nickell et al., 2003) . 5 A preference for wage increases at the expense of employment arises whenever some majority of workers know themselves to be insulated from job cuts (as reductions in the labour force are, for instance, by inverse seniority with the firm, see Oswald, 1993 and Mitchell, 1972) . Third, the optimal level of employment according to the RTM always locates on the labour demand curve. It is thus labour demand, which determines the corporate wage bill and tax incidence, to which we turn next.
CAPTURING INCIDENCE
This section describes how we calculate the share of the CIT burden that is shifted on to labour. We first introduce the corporate wage bill as a variable that summarizes different labour market outcomes. Then, we discuss the theoretical predictions 3. In that respect the right-to-manage model differs from the efficient wage bargaining model, in which both wage rates and employment are chosen in the collective bargaining process. 4. This can be also shown more formally, by expanding the standard right-to-manage model through the inclusion of the average tax rate (ATR) on corporate income. The augmented model (available upon request from the authors) shows that lower average tax rates increase firms' economic rents and lead, ceteris paribus, to higher bargained wage rates. That is the bargained wage rate is a decreasing function of the ATR on corporate profits. CIT rates matter for wage bargaining whenever an entrepreneur's outside option is larger than zero (Goerke, 1996) or whenever the CIT deviates from a pure profit tax (for instance, because of the deviation between the value of tax depreciation and economic depreciation). The latter is very likely to hold under the current provisions and rate structures of the German tax system. Also, depreciation allowances for tax purposes, for instance, are often set with economic growth or structural change in mind, rather than with the goal of fully matching economic depreciation. All of these arguments suggest that a direct effect of the CIT on the wage rate is present. 5. This also suggests that unemployment levels in previous periods do not feedback on wage rates.
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of the effect of an exogenous change in the statutory CIT rate on the corporate wage bill. Last, we calculate the tax elasticity of the corporate wage bill in order to determine the elasticities which need to be estimated in our empirical work below.
The corporate wage bill
The corporate wage bill summarizes all relevant labour market outcomes: wage rates paid, hours worked and number of employees. While the wage rate reflects the price of labour, both hours worked and the number of employees refer to the quantity of labour demanded. As we will discuss below, the price and the quantity components of the corporate wage bill are differentlyor even oppositelyaffected by changes to the statutory CIT rate. In order to fully picture the tax burden shifted on to labour, then, it is important to separately take these margins into account, instead of focussing on wages only.
The corporate wage bill is defined as the product of the wage rate (w) and total labour demanded (L d ):
The wage rate in the RTM is determined by collective bargaining at the industry/regional level, while employment is determined by firms' labour demand, which is a function of the wage rate as the price of labour. As discussed above and shown more formally in the Appendix S1A, a larger average tax burden reduces the quasi-rent to be bargained over, given pretax profits, such that the wage rate negatively depends on the ATR. The ATR is a function of the statutory proportional CIT rate (s).
We measure employment in full-time equivalents, summarizing hours worked per employee and the number of employed people. Since there is no detailed information on working hours in our labour market dataset, we do not separately model adjustments in hours worked but instead use hourly wage rates.
Tax-related effects on the corporate wage bill
Next, we discuss the theoretical predictions of the effect of an exogenous change in the statutory CIT rate on the corporate wage bill. Taking the derivative of the corporate wage bill with respect to the statutory CIT rate s generates:
Eq.
(2) shows two effects of the CIT on the wage bill: The first effect is expressed by the term @w @ATR @ATR @s L d and describes the CIT effect on wage rates. The second summand, w @L d @w @w @ATR @ATR @s h i , describes the effect of the CIT on employment, operating through the price of labour. We now describe the two effects in detail.
The first effect of the CIT on the corporate wage bill is related to wage rates and arises from bargaining over economic quasi-rents, as discussed above: A lower CIT burden increases the size of the quasi-rent to be bargained over, for a given pretax profit.
In addition to collective bargaining, wage rates are potentially indirectly affected by the CIT through the level of pretax profits. We do not attempt to estimate this indirect effect of the CIT on wage rates. As extensively discussed in Arulampalam et al. (2012) , identification of indirect incidence is precluded by general equilibrium effects simultaneously affecting labour productivity, capital stock and output. We therefore limit ourselves, while controlling for other factors, to the direct effect of the CIT on wage rates.
The second effect of the CIT on the corporate wage bill is related to labour demand. Any change in wage rate affects the level of employment through a movement along the labour demand curve. In the previous section, we saw that employers unilaterally adjust the level of employment once the (bargained) wage rate is known: If worker representatives negotiate a higher wage rate following a cut in the CIT burden, this might lead to a reduction in employment. A decrease in the CIT burden thus leads to a lower level of employment, transmitted through the wage bargaining process. The reduction in the number of employees and the tax-related increase in wage rates discussed earlier are opposites in terms of their effects on the size of the corporate wage bill.
Combining the first and second effects of the CIT on the corporate wage bill leads to the direct incidence of the tax.
Combining the effects in the elasticity of the corporate wage bill
In our empirical estimations below, we identify tax-related effects on both wage rates and labour demanded. Since we estimate elasticities, it is useful to rewrite eq. (2) in elasticities. This leads to the elasticity of the corporate wage bill with respect to the statutory CIT rate:
with g L d ;w ¼ @L d @w w L d ; g w;ATR ¼ @w @ATR ATR w ; and g ATR;s ¼ @ATR @s s ATR .
(3) summarises our empirical approach. We analyse how exogenous changes in the statutory CIT rate affect the corporate wage bill. We thereby differentiate the impact of the CIT on wage rates from its effect on employment (operating through wage bargaining). While the wage-related effect of a cut in CIT rates on the corporate wage bill is unambiguously positive, the ensuing employment reduction is opposite in terms of effect on the size of the corporate wage bill. The net increase in the corporate wage bill in response to a cut in the statutory CIT rate will depend on the relative magnitudes of the tax elasticity of the wage rate (g w,ATR ), the wage elasticity of employment (g L d ;w ) and the elasticity of the ATR with respect to the statutory CIT rate (g ATR,s ). All of these elasticities determine direct incidence and are estimated in the empirical work below. We do not attempt to estimate indirect or total CIT incidence, which would need to include tax effects on pretax profits from capital stock, labour productivity and output.
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DATA
Our panel dataset spans the observation period from 1998 to 2006. As discussed in Section 2, collective wage bargaining takes place at the industry-region level in Germany. In our empirical analysis, we mirror these institutional conditions, using industry-region groups as units of observation. To construct our units of observation, we aggregated firm-specific tax information and individual-level labour market data to the industry-region level. In Section 4.1, we describe how the micro datasets were aggregated. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 introduce the corporate tax return and labour market data. Finally, Section 4.4 provides descriptive statistics on tax and labour market variables.
Level of analysis: industry-region group
We aggregated and combined several micro datasets to obtain a panel dataset at the industry-region level covering tax and labour information. More precisely, we grouped corporations and individual employees by industry and region. Because the micro datasets used for aggregation each cover all German corporations and their employees, averages at the industry-region group level correspond to the population group averages.
We aim at a grouping which closely reflects the geographical and industrial level of wage negotiation. Unfortunately, information is available neither on the precise regional level at which negotiations were conducted nor on whether subindustries reached a joint wage settlement or not. Yet, we know that the level of negotiation is mainly determined by the size of the industry: Large industries usually bargain at the federal states level, while industries containing few firms are more likely to bargain at a superordinate region-or industry-level. This insight led us to group together corporations which were operating in the same subindustry (five-digit industry code) and in the same federal state while imposing a minimum group size of 50 corporations. 6 To ensure a group size of 50 or more corporations, we aggregated the data by applying a sequential procedure running from detailed to rougher industry and region classifications (see chart in the Appendix S1B). That is, we assessed the number of corporations within each group initially constructed at the five-digit industry level, with differentiation along federal states. If there were more than 50 corporations in a group, it was kept. Otherwise, we went for a slightly more aggregated grouping at the five-digit industry level, omitting the differentiation along federal states, and instead using East vs. West Germany. In this way, we kept industry-region groups covering at least 50 corporations and grouped the other corporations on the superordinate level. Following this procedure, each corporation was assigned to one of 856 groups. 127 out of these 856 groups 6. A minimum group size of 50 corporations was also imposed to make sure that the industryregion fixed effect remained unaffected by firm exit and entry (we cannot drop firms entering/ leaving as the corporate tax return micro data are currently not available as a panel). Industry classification and location of headquarter usually remain constant. We do not expect corporations to change their industry classifications or to relocate their headquarters in the short time horizon of our dataset or in response to the tax reform. Differencing should thus eliminate any time invariant differences between industry-region groups. involve regional information: 100 groups are formed at the federal states level and 27 at the level of East or West Germany.
Corporate tax return data
The industry-region level information on the tax burden, capital and output stems from corporate tax return data from 1998 to 2006. Tax return data consist of all (unconsolidated) tax returns filed in a given year and offer several distinct advantages compared with accounting data used in prior literature. First, tax return data represent all corporations subject to the German CIT, which means nearly 740,000 firms in 1998 and about 860,000 in 2004. Second, they provide detailed information on the tax assessed and on all reported items, together with firm characteristics such as industry, region and legal form. This information enables us to construct firm-specific variables in the first place and to subsequently aggregate these variables to our industry-region level of analysis. To build the variables of interest, we resort to three different sources of corporate tax return data, compiled by the German Federal Statistical Offices: CIT statistics, local business tax statistics and value added tax statistics. Our measure of the corporate income tax burden of an industry-region group is based upon the German CIT statistics, which are published every 3 years. 7 When writing the paper, the latest year available was 2004, so that we can use tax variations of the years 1998, 2001 and 2004 to measure CIT incidence. In each year t, we calculate the firm f specific average tax burden, which is then aggregated to the ATR of an industry-region group g:
where NPBL is net profit before loss carry-over. The ATR measures the percentage of pretax profits in an industry-region group that has to be paid in corporate income taxes, and, thus the tax curtailment in the quasi-rent that workers and employers can bargain over. An industry-region's ATR differs from the statutory rate because of tax credits for foreign-source income and because of the difference between NPBL and taxable income, which is mainly driven by losses brought forward from earlier periods 8 (see Appendix S1C).
We use the sum of equity, debt and the legal minimum deposit, which amounts to €25,000 for private limited liability companies and to €50,000 for public companies as a proxy for total capital, the second production factor. Equity is recorded in the CIT return statistics. Long-term debt can be derived 7. See www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/SocietyState/PublicFinanceTaxes/Taxes/CorporationTax/Cor porationTax.html. The German Statistical Offices (national level and federal states level) also publish detailed tables with descriptive information, for example, at the industry level. 8. The amount of a corporation's tax loss carry-back and carry-forward is deductible against current profits. In Germany, a net operating loss does not lead to an immediate tax rebate but is deductible against positive profits from other years. Companies that have paid corporate income tax in the year(s) before may carry back the loss and receive a tax refund. If the loss in the following year exceeds profits or a legally defined maximum carry-back, the remaining loss must be carried forward in time; the resulting tax loss carry-forward, which is valid for an unlimited period of time, is deductible against future positive profits.
from the local business tax statistics 9 , which are available for the years 1998, 2001 and 2004 (see Appendix S1D1). Sales from the yearly value added tax (VAT) statistics 10 are used as a measure for output.
To estimate the number of additional employees ascribed to greater capital stock, we need a measure of the price of capital. We employ the user cost of capital, which is the minimal rate of return that must be earned on an investment project before taxes to break even. Following its standard definition, we calculate the user cost of capital based on input and output prices, interest rates, economic depreciation, and depreciation allowances (for details, see Dwenger, 2014) .
Labour market data
All labour market variables are based on the full record of those 32 million individuals, who were employed and subject to social security in Germany between 1998 and 2006 (including "marginally" employed people 11 but excluding civil servants and the self-employed). The data are collected by the Federal Employment Agency from two sources: First, every employer has to notify the agency whenever a new employee enters the workforce or leaves the establishment. Second, employers report on all their current employees at the end of each calendar year. For scientific use, the research institute of the Federal Employment Agency (IAB) assembles the data in the historical files of Social Security.
The dataset contains individual-level information on employment status, on monthly wages and on personal characteristics such as age, sex and work experience. Importantly, it also provides information on the industry, region and size of the employer. These variables allow us to aggregate the information on each employee to obtain the characteristics of the average workforce in an industry-region group.
Before describing the aggregated variables, we would like to mention two details of how we constructed them at the level of the individual employee. First, employers report monthly wages to the Federal Employment Agency. We calculate the hourly wage rate for each individual i as their monthly wage divided by the hours worked. For this purpose, we imputed data on working hours from the Microcensus 12 1999-2006 (Appendix S1D2). For each year during our observation period, we differentiated 300 subgroups in the imputation with regard to industry, gender, region, employment type (full-time, part-time, marginal), and education (low, medium, high). Second, data on marginally employed people appear in the Social Security system only from the second quarter of 1999 onwards. We use the development of employment and wage rates of the marginally employed between the first quarter and the remainder of the year through 2000 to extrapolate the number of marginally employed people and their wage rates for the first quarter of 1999 (Appendix S1D3). We aggregate all individual characteristics to the industry-region level. For each industry-region group, we obtain the number of people employed, the median wage rate paid, and a set of explanatory variables. To avoid oversampling of individuals with longer employment spells, we weighted observations according to the length of employment (for details, see Appendix S1D4). The average number of people employed in each year is the sum of monthly employment divided by 12. The median wage rate is drawn from the yearly distribution of wage rates within an industry-region group. We resort to median wage rates (instead of using average wage rates) to avoid any censoring from above in the wage variable: In the upper part of the wage distribution, observations are censored at the Social Security assessment ceiling, which for unemployment and old age insurance was €51,538/year (€42,949/year) in 1998 and €63,000/year (€52,800/year) in 2006 for West (East) Germany. The 50th percentile of wages is always below the Social Security assessment ceiling, so that we can circumvent any problem of censoring using median hourly wage rates. The median wage rate is also the pertinent measure if wage bargaining behaviour is determined by the median voter rule: In this case, the median individual exactly is the person with the median wage rate. To control for the composition of the workforce in an industry-region group, we computed average values for age, establishment size and work experience, each weighted by the number of employees in a given month and year. We also constructed variables reflecting the share of women, foreigners and fulltime employees in an industry-region group.
Descriptive statistics
In Tables 1 and 2 , we present the means and standard deviations of our labour market and tax variables, measured at the industry-region level. All variables in nominal monetary terms (i.e., wage rates, sales and capital) are deflated using producer price indices of the corresponding industries from the German Federal Statistical Office to partial out any adjustment in output prices that might result from a change in taxation.
Median wage rates for all employees amounted to about €11.49/hour in 1999. After a compression in 2000, real wage rates began to rise in 2001, before contracting again since 2004. On average, industry-region groups employed between 35,000 and 37,000 individuals in our observation period. The shares of women, foreigners and full-time employees showed a stable pattern in group averages across time.
As Table 2 shows, the Tax Relief Act reduced the ATR by 4 percentage points on average, from 11.5% in 1998 to 7.5% in 2001. In 2004, the newly introduced cap on the use of tax losses carried forward slightly increased the ATR to 7.7%. Compared with a drop in the statutory tax rate by 20 percentage points for most corporations (Sections 5.1 and 5.2), the reduction in ATR was much smaller. Various factors contributed to this difference, which we exploit to identify tax incidence (Section 5.2). 
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After an increase from 0.163 in 1998 to 0.181 in 2000, the user cost of capital again receded to lower levels following the Tax Relief Act (2001 Act ( : 0.168, 2006 ). The potential loss carry-forward nearly doubled, on average, between 1998 (€690,000) and 2004 (€1.2 million). Economic activity, as measured by average sales in real terms, increased steadily from €284 million in 1998 to €374 million in 2006. Total capital increased from €4.4 million in 1998 to €6.7 million in 2006. Table 3 provides additional descriptive statistics by industries. Most of our groups belong to manufacturing; electricity, gas and water supply and construction; wholesale and retail trade and repair of goods as well as to real estate, renting and business activities. This reflects the large number of corporations active in these industries and our sequential grouping procedure, which runs from detailed to rougher industry and region classifications (see description in Section 4.1). Hourly wage rates are lowest in hotels and restaurants and highest in financial intermediation and manufacturing. Note that there is also significant variation in the number of employed and in the ATR. As we will detail below, we exploit exogenous changes in the ATR to identify tax incidence, and we difference the data to remove any differences in initial levels across groups.
IDENTIFICATION AND EMPIRICAL MODEL
Our identification of corporate income tax incidence comes from exogenous variation in the change of the CIT burden across groups between 1998 and 2006. In Section 5.1, we briefly present the German CIT system of 1998 and describe the tax reforms undertaken during our observation period. Section 5.2 provides a discussion of how firms, and thus our industry-region groups, were affected differently by the reforms. In Section 5.3, we describe our empirical model of the wage and employment equations and discuss various econometric issues.
The German CIT system 1998-2004: structure and tax reforms
In Germany, as elsewhere, the CIT is levied on corporate enterprises, public and private limited companies and other corporations (e.g., cooperatives, associations, foundations). Sole proprietorships and partnerships are not subject to the CIT; profits earned by a non-incorporated firm are attributed to the firm's individual partners and taxed according to their personal income tax schedules. The assessment base of the CIT, or taxable income, can be derived from the amount of profits recorded in the tax balance sheet (see Appendix S1C).
Initially, the German CIT system was based on the tax credit method, such that the amount of CIT assessed was credited against the personal income tax of the shareholder, and retained earnings were subject to a higher tax rate than distributed profits (McDonald, 2001) . Some corporations and income from foreign sources benefited from reduced statutory CIT rates.
In 2001, the Tax Relief Act eliminated the imputation system in favour of the half-income method. Since then the marginal tax rate on corporate income has been uniform across corporations and independent of the appropriation of profits (Dwenger and Steiner, 2014) . According to the half-income method, CIT is definite, and half of the dividends are subjected to personal income tax. We Corporate Tax Incidence cannot include personal income taxes in our analysis as we do not have the information about a corporation's shareholders (such as their participation quotas and their income from other sources) that is necessary for calculating marginal personal income tax rates. Besides the change in CIT system, the reform significantly lowered the statutory CIT rate from 45% (in 1998) to 25% for the remaining period of our sample. In return, the reform broadened the tax base by lowering depreciation allowances, by introducing a requirement to reinstate original values, and by cutting the use of tax loss carry-backs.
In 2004, the Tax Preference Reduction Act introduced a cap on the use of tax loss carry-forwards. Under this so-called minimum taxation, taxable income up to an amount of €1 million can be fully offset by tax losses carried forward. Any taxable income exceeding this amount can only be partly offset; 40% of the taxable income is immediately taxed.
Exogenous variation in the ATR induced by the tax reforms
The Tax Relief Act and the Tax Preference Reduction Act described above provide exogenous variation in the CIT burden. Both tax reforms came about in a very short time window so that firms had no opportunity to anticipate the reforms. 13 There are several reasons why the two reforms did not affect corporations equally, introducing substantial variation in the changes of the ATR across industry-region groups.
(1) The tax reduction caused by the Tax Relief Act was dependent on a corporation's profit distribution. Under the tax credit method initially in place, the statutory CIT rate differed between retained and distributed earnings. In 1998, the statutory tax rate was 45% (1999 and 2000: 40%) for retained and 30% for distributed profits. Thus, the shift to a uniform tax rate more strongly relieved corporations retaining their earnings, compared to corporations distributing profits. (2) Some corporations experienced a belated drop in their statutory CIT rate as they were not eligible for lower tax rates until 2002 (as they had a fiscal year different from the calendar year). (3) The change in the ATR does not only depend on the change in the statutory CIT rate but also on changes to the CIT base, adversely affecting some but not all corporations. For example, corporations that placed large real investments in pre-and post-tax reform years saw their after-reform tax base broadened because of lower depreciation allowances for newly acquired goods, compared with pre-reform years. Similarly, the requirement to reinstate original values and restrictions on the use of tax loss carry-backs, both introduced by the Tax Relief Act, lead to additional variation in the change of the ATR. (4) Corporations which offset their profits against losses from other periods did not pay any CIT and thus their CIT rate remained unaffected by the Tax Relief Act. It is important to note that firms cannot decide upon whether 13. The first reading of the Tax Preference Reduction Act took place on September 8, 2003. The Tax Relief Act was discussed for the first time on November 13, 1998. and when to use tax losses carried forward. Existing tax loss carry-forwards must be fully offset against current profits. (5) At the beginning of our observation period, several corporations and income from foreign sources were eligible for reduced statutory CIT rates; a uniform tax rate has been applied since 2001. Initial statutory CIT rates were equal to 22.5% for operators of merchant ships in international waters and 42% for mutual insurance societies, private foundations and business enterprises of public corporations. Foreign source income benefited from a reduced statutory CIT rate of 25%. The Tax Relief Act applied a uniform tax rate of 25%, which led to heterogeneous changes in the statutory CIT rate and in the ATR, depending on initial rates. (6) The minimum taxation introduced in 2004, which affected about 3,500 corporations, provides additional variation in the change of the statutory CIT rate and the ATR that firms face.
Because of these items, the two tax reforms affected firms differently, as pertains to the effective reduction in their CIT burden and to the point in time in which the tax reforms took effect. Note that we aim at capturing all sources of variation in the change in ATR although some of these reasons (such as those described in items 2, 5 and 6) only affected a relatively small number of firms. To assess the robustness of our results we re-run all regressions only exploiting the variation introduced by the Tax Relief Act.
Overall, the variation in the change in individual firm's tax burdens leads to substantial variation in the change in the ATR across industry-region groups, which we will pick up to identify CIT incidence. Figure 1 ( figures to the left) shows that the groups in our estimation sample faced very different ATRs. There is substantial variation both in the ATR within the cross-sections (Panel a) as well as in the change in ATR over time (Panel b).
Empirical model
To estimate the direct incidence of the CIT on labour, we proceed in two steps. First, we estimate the effect of the ATR on the bargained wage rate, adapting the empirical literature on wage determination (Section 5.3.1.). Second, we analyse whether tax-related changes in the price of capital and labour feedback on employment by estimating a tax augmented employment equation (Section 5.3.2.). Our main innovation is to disentangle tax effects on the price (wage rate) and quantity (employment) of labour. Instead of making the strong assumption that total labour demand is unchanged after a corporate tax reform, we also investigate whether firms decide to hire or fire employees due to newly negotiated wage rates after a CIT reform.
Tax effects on wages
To investigate the role of the CIT on bargained wage rates, we estimate a wage equation at the industry-region level, which was augmented by workforce characteristics that proxy for productivity effects (eq. (5)). Using industry-region-level Corporate Tax Incidence data accommodates the wage bargaining process described in Section 2. Our dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the median gross hourly wage rate, w. The independent variables include variables controlling for observed and unobserved heterogeneity across industry-region groups and the ATR as the variable of interest. 
To account for observed heterogeneity in the workforce across industry-region groups, we include a vector of control variables x g,t . The vector of controls shows the average characteristics of the workforce in an industry-region group g at time t and includes average age, average age squared, share of women and share of foreigners.
Year dummies (D t ) are included to absorb common time trends and to cover the outside option of the workers. We also tested for a differential time trend in East and West German wages but could not reject the hypothesis that the time trend was equal in the two regions. As bargaining regimes might differ across industries and over time, we allowed for industry-specific time trends in a robustness check; results remained unchanged. Following the literature, we assume that workers receive the level of utility of an unemployed person if employers and worker representatives do not reach an agreement. During our observation period, the unemployment insurance replacement rate was about 60% and constant across industries.
Differencing solves the problem of unobserved heterogeneity by removing the group fixed effect, m g . It also purges potential differences in the bargaining power of unions and differences in the outside option of employers across groups provided these factors can be assumed to be fixed over time. 14 Because tax return data are observed at intervals of three years only (see Section 4.2), we do not consider year-to-year changes in our dataset but use longer differences over time. More precisely, we calculate the change in the dependent variable as Dy i,t = y i,ty i,tÀ3 and the change in each explanatory variable as Dx i,t = x i,tx i,tÀ3 . Because the years for which tax return data are observed coincide with the years in which the tax law reforms became effective, using longer differences still allows us to capture the variation in ATR.
Wage rates are negotiated based on past after-tax quasi-rents, with two implications for our specification. First, in our baseline regression, we include the ATR from the previous year instead of the contemporaneous tax variable. Second, it might take some time for taxes to fully unfold their effect on the wage rate. Labour market information is available for each year between 1999 and 2006 and tax information is observed in all years in which major changes in the ATR became effective (2001 and 2004) . We can thus allow the change in ATR occurring in these reform years to affect future changes in wage rates with a lag. To identify the gradual effect of changes in the ATR on changes in wage rates, we interact the ATR with a set of three binary variables, which indicate the amount of time elapsed after the tax reform had become effective. In the year following a tax reform r, the dummy variable D g;t¼rþ1 equals 1, otherwise it is equal to 0; analogously, D g;t¼rþ2 (D g;t¼rþ3 ) is equal to 1 in the second (third) year after the 14. The employers' outside options matter for the Nash bargaining outcome. In the labour literature it is standard to assume that firms get zero profit if wage bargaining remains without mutual consent. Our specification is more flexible and also accommodates outside options larger than zero, as long as they are time invariant.
reform took place and 0 otherwise. 15 In using this specification, we assume that the wage rate effects of the two tax reforms were underlying the same dynamics. That is, the effect of the change in ATR on the change in wage rates in the year following the reform is assumed to be the same for the Tax Relief Act and for the Tax Preference Reduction Act. The same needs to apply for the tax effects in the second and the third post-reform years. Since there is no reason to suspect that the two reforms differ in terms of their dynamics, we allow negotiated wage rates to respond to the ATR with time lags as indicated in eq. (5). Note that macroeconomic shocks may produce correlation between wage rates paid by an industry-region group and the group's average level of pretax profits, also determining the ATR. Because of the potential endogeneity of the ATR, we instrument this term by a counter-factual ATR, exogenous to an industry-region group. The counter-factual ATR is constructed following the method proposed by Gruber and Saez (2002) : First, all firm-specific, profit-related components of the 1998 cross-section are aged to match aggregate values from 2001 (2004) (see Appendix S1E2). Then we simulate the counter-factual CIT assessed and the counter-factual NPBL for each firm using the microsimulation model BizTax (see Appendix S1E1), based on the CIT law 2001 CIT law (2004 . Finally, we use these variables to calculate the counter-factual ATR at the industry-region level, based on eq. (4). As can be seen from Figure 1 (figures to the right) , the counter-factual ATR varies significantly between our observation groups.
An instrumental variable estimation of eq. (5) yields the semi-elasticity of the wage rate with respect to the ATR (∑b). Standard errors of the semi-elasticity are calculated using the delta method. a is a constant, and φ and j are column vectors of regression coefficients. g,t is an error term for each group, which may or may not be serially correlated.
In one of the specifications, we additionally include the average number of employees in each group as an explanatory variable, holding the level of employment fixed. As discussed in the following subsection, we then separately estimate the repercussions of the negotiated wage rate on employment levels. Because unobserved shocks, for example, to output, might affect both employment and the wage rate, we treat the employment variable in the wage equation as endogenous. We use the fourth lag of the share of the full-time employed and the share of the full-time employed in 1998 as instrumental variables for employment.
Tax effects on employment
Next, we discuss the effects of the CIT on employment. Our dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the average number of employees in group g at time t, L d g;t . The employment equation includes the standard Mincer control variables (x g,t ) discussed in the previous section to account for productivity effects at the level of aggregation. Again, time dummies (D t ) purge any time trend that is common to all industry-region groups from our regression. During the transition 15. Expressed in the longer differences used in our regressions, we estimate the gradual effect of (ATR 2001 process in East Germany from a communist to a capitalist economy in the 1990s, unemployment rose. To capture differential employment trends in East and West Germany that might still have persisted during our observation period, we additionally include a dummy for East Germany (east) and its interactions with the year dummies. We estimate the following equation:
where d and p are constants, /, j and h are column vectors of regression coefficients, and g,t is an error term for each group, which may or may not be serially correlated. To account for unobserved heterogeneity across industry-region groups and to eliminate group fixed effects m g , we estimate the equation in firstdifferences. We include the hourly wage rate in the equation to assess the wage elasticity of employment g L d ;w . Such change in employment stems from a movement along the labour demand curve. Because of potential endogeneity of the contemporaneous wage rate, we instrument this term using the second lag of real wages, first differences in the third lag of real wages and first differences in the lagged fractions of education as instrumental variables. In a robustness check, we no longer assume capital stock to be fixed (and thus purged from our regression through first-differencing), but instead assume that firms adjust their capital stock if a tax cut lowers the user cost of capital and therefore include the user cost of capital as an additional regressor. Thus, due to a change in the price of capital, the labour demand curve can either be shifted outor inwards, depending on the relative size of the scale and substitution effects. An outwards (inwards) shift would be reflected by a negative (positive) semi-elasticity of employment with respect to the user cost of capital. In our first-differenced equation, we instrument first-differences of the user cost of capital (UCC) variable with the third lag of its level to account for potential endogeneity.
ESTIMATION RESULTS
In Section 6.1, we estimate the effect of the average CIT burden on wage rates. Then, in Section 6.2, we analyse the impact of tax-related changes in wage rates on employment. Finally, we explore the implications of our estimates for CIT incidence in Section 6.3. Table 4 presents results for the effect of the ATR on wage rates, using different specifications based on eq. (5). All specifications include time dummies and account for industry-region group fixed effects. Estimating the wage equation in differences also eliminates potential differences in the bargaining power of unions across industry-region groups.
Results on tax-related wage effects
A standard Hausman test, which compares the OLS estimates with the 2SLS regression from column (1) in Table 4 , indicates that ATR is endogenous in the Corporate Tax Incidence 0.230
Notes: Heteroscedasticity-consistent robust (Huber-White) standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard errors of the tax semi-elasticity of the wage rate are calculated with the delta method. All specifications include time fixed effects and are estimated in differences, using 3-year differences. We use the counterfactual ATR as an instrument for the ATR in all estimations (see text); in column (5), we instrument the lagged dependent variable by the share of low-skilled workers, lagged by four periods; in columns (6) and (7), we use the fourth lag of sales and the fourth lag of the user cost of capital as instruments for sales and capital respectively. The share of the full-time employed in 1998 and the fourth lag of the share of the full-time employed provide the instrumental variable for employment in column (8). Information on sales is only available for 847 of our 856 groups.
Sources:
Own calculations based on aggregated data from the historical files for the years 1998 Corporate Tax Incidence wage regression; the v 2 test statistic equals 25.06 (p = 0.001). We therefore estimate the wage equation by two stage least squares (2SLS) and instrument the ATR with its simulated counterfactual to obtain consistent estimates of the tax (semi-)elasticity of the wage rate. The Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006) and calculations of the partial R 2 of excluded instruments (Godfrey, 1999; Shea, 1997) show that the counterfactual ATRs are highly correlated with the actual ATRs. As the instruments are clearly relevant, our 2SLS estimations are not impaired by the well-known weak instrument problem or by underidentification. We present first-stage results of our baseline specification in Appendix S1F; first-stage results for all further specifications are available from the authors on request.
All reported standard errors are robust to serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. We use the delta method to derive standard errors for the estimated long-run semi-elasticities of the wage rate with respect to the ATR; the standard errors are very similar if they are computed with bootstrapping methods (unreported results). To turn the estimated semi-elasticities into estimates of the tax elasticity of the wage rate, we evaluate semi-elasticities at the average ATR of 1998 (= 0.115).
Column (1) reports the results obtained by regressing the log of the wage rate on past levels of the ATR, without further control variables, although group fixed effects take time-invariant differences in the workforce across groups away. Our baseline specification in column (2) controls for the average characteristics of the workforce, including average age. The estimated coefficients on the control variables all show the expected signs. The specification yields an estimate of the long-run semi-elasticity of the wage rate with respect to the ATR of -1.677, which is equal to a tax elasticity of the wage rate of À0.193 (p < 0.001). The elasticity estimate implies that lowering the ATR by 1% increases wage rates by about 0.2%.
We subject the results from our baseline estimation to several robustness checks. First, we allow the ATR to immediately affect wage rates, as opposed to imposing a 1-year time lag. Including the contemporaneous ATR in column (3) yields a semi-elasticity of À1.704 (elasticity: À0.196), which is not statistically different from our baseline result in column (2) at any conventional significance level.
Second, we give tax effects more time to unfold as wages might be sticky. On average, wage agreements in Germany are negotiated for only 20 months. 16 Yet, wage agreements in some industries might be concluded for longer time frames, especially in the manufacturing sector. All specifications presented thus far share the underlying assumption that tax effects fully unfold within the first 3 years. Including the lagged dependent variable into the baseline specification gives wage rates more time to adjust to changes in the ATR. Column (4) reports regression results if lagged wage rates are assumed to be exogenous; in column (5), we instrument the lagged dependent variable by the share of low-skilled workers, lagged by four periods. Adding the lagged dependent variable, whether it is considered exogenous or endogenous, slightly reduces the point estimate of the 16. See, e.g., https://www.boeckler.de/wsi-tarifarchiv_4832.htm. estimated semi-elasticity but increases its estimated standard error. We cannot reject the null hypotheses that the semi-elasticities are equal to our baseline estimate.
Third, we condition tax effects on sales to preclude changes in output to impair our tax-related wage bargaining results. Information on sales is available for 847 of our 856 groups. Our sales variable does not include exports and is, thus, an imprecise measure of output. As long as export shares remain unchanged in the observation period, this measurement error is time invariant and should be accounted for by the group fixed effects. Since unobserved shocks might affect both the wage rate and contemporary output, we instrument current sales by its fourth lag in column (6) [and column (7)]. However, including sales does not significantly change the estimate of the tax elasticity of the wage rate.
Fourth, we additionally include capital (instrumented by the fourth lag of its user cost) so as to avoid changes to the second production factor confounding our estimation results. Column (7) presents the results and shows our estimates to be robust towards changes in both production technology and output, as determinants of pretax profits. These determinants of pretax profits are related to indirect incidence, which we do not attempt to estimate. We would like to note that our instrumental variables for sales and capital are rather weak (partial R 2 of 0.03 and 0.01, respectively). Conditioning on capital and sales increases the estimated coefficients and standard errors but the long-run elasticity of the wage rate with respect to the ATR is statistically indistinguishable from our baseline estimate.
In summary, the baseline results shown in column (2) of Table 4 prove to be very robust regarding the sensitivity checks discussed above. This is also true if we consider variation introduced by the Tax Relief Act only. The corresponding estimation results for Tables 4 and 5 can be found in Appendix S1G (Tables OA2  and OA3 ). Below, we use the baseline specification to discuss the role of employment in the determination of wage rates.
Our baseline specification resembles the models used in previous literature in that it does not allow us to disentangle tax effects on the price of labour and on the quantity of labour demanded. A simple wage equation, thus, potentially suffers from an omitted variable bias, which is likely to upwards bias the estimate of the tax elasticity of the wage rate. The institutional background discussed earlier suggests that worker representatives negotiated inefficiently high wage rates during our observation period, making responses in employment very likely. That is, employers might have compensated the increase in wage rates paid by reducing their number of employees. Merely focussing on wage determination thus overestimates the share of the CIT burden borne by labour.
In our incidence analysis, we take a broader view and additionally account for tax effects on the quantity of labour demanded. To this end, we include employment as a regressor in the wage equation. This allows us to estimate the tax elasticity of the wage rate, holding employment fixed. In the following section, we then analyse to what extent tax-related price changes of labour affect the quantity of labour demanded.
Adding the natural log of the number of employees (instrumented by the share of full-time employed in 1998) to our baseline specification yields a larger estimate of the tax elasticity of the wage rate [column (8) ]. The semi-elasticity of the wage rate with respect to the ATR equal to À2.049 (p < 0.001) corresponds to an elasticity estimate of À0.235. Table 5 shows by how much employers change their workforce in response to a tax-related change in prices. The results are based on the employment equation [eq. (6)], as described in Section 5.3.2 (including differential time trends for East and West Germany). We account for industry-region group fixed effects by first-differencing the data. In the 2SLS estimation, we use the second lag of real wages, first differences of the third lag of real wages, and first differences of the lagged fractions of education as instrumental variables for the most likely endogenous contemporaneous wage rate. In the specification including the user cost of capital, the third lag of its level is used as an instrument. The Sargan test and the partial R 2 Shea, presented in Table 5 , indicate that our instrumental variables are valid and relevant. All reported standard errors are robust to serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. First, we estimate short run tax effects on employment, assuming capital to be fixed. If so, first-differencing purges any differences in capital stock across industry-region groups from our employment equation. Turning to the coefficient estimates in column (1), we find that employers partly compensate an increase in negotiated wage rates by reducing their workforce. The wage rate elasticity of labour demand equal to À0.586 (p-value: 0.029) implies that an increase in the wage rate by 1% reduces the number of the employed by 0.6%.
Results on tax-related employment effects
Second, we assume that the capital stock is adjusted if its user cost changed. We do so by including the user cost of capital (UCC) in column (2), such that the estimation equation reflects the first order condition for labour demand of a standard production model. We find evidence for both a movement along the labour demand curve induced by greater wage rates (wage rate elasticity of labour demand equal to -0.714, p-value: 0.006) and a tax-related shift of it (labour demand elasticity with respect to the UCC of -0.954, p-value: 0.001). The net effect of the increase in capital stock on employment depends on the relative size of the scale and the substitution effects. In our estimation we find that a cut in the price of capital, associated with larger capital stock, leads to an increase in employment. We therefore conclude that the scale effect dominates the substitution effect.
Evaluation of CIT incidence and employment
Finally, we explore the implications of our estimates for CIT incidence and study the effects on the actual number of employees. Our first measure of direct CIT incidence provides for both margins of the corporate wage bill-wage rates and employment. As we will discuss, employment responses are important both quantitatively and for correct calculation of direct incidence. The second measure provided is comparable to results in previous literature in that it exclusively focuses on wage rate responses.
Our first measure of direct CIT incidence is based on tax-related changes in both wage rates and employment. The results are calculated based on the tax elasticity of the wage rate given in eq. (3), which is reproduced for ease of reference.
As discussed in Section 3.3, eq. (3) refers to the net effect of wage bargaining on the corporate wage bill. To evaluate the elasticity of the corporate wage bill with respect to the statutory CIT rate, we plug in the estimated elasticities. The tax elasticity of the wage rate, holding employment fixed, is À0.235 (column (8) in Table 4 ). In Table 5 , we estimated the wage elasticity of employment under two different scenarios concerning the capital stock, which was assumed to be either fixed or variable. With capital stock assumed to be fixed (variable), we find a wage elasticity of employment of À0.586 (À0.714). Finally, we calculate the elasticity of the ATR with respect to the statutory CIT rate, which is equal to 0.324. 17 Based on these elasticity estimates, we obtain the tax elasticity of the corporate wage bill, equal to -0.032 (capital assumed to be fixed) and À0.022 (capital stock allowed to vary).
To identify CIT incidence, it is useful to contrast the loss in CIT revenue, caused by a cut in the statutory CIT rate, with the associated increase in the corporate wage bill. Calculations of CIT incidence using the estimated elasticities from above are presented in Table 6 . We start by assuming capital stock to be fixed. Based on the elasticity of the corporate wage bill of À0.032, we find that an exogenous €1 decrease in the CIT burden leads to a 28 cents increase in the corporate wage bill. Our approach allows us to split the incidence result into its theoretical components, namely the wage increase and the employment effects caused by a movement along the labour demand curve. A tax reduction by €1 increases the corporate wage bill by 67 cents. Yet, employers exercise their right to lay-off workers in response to the wage rates set. Such movement along the labour demand curve results in a theoretical reduction in the corporate wage bill by 39 cents. Combining the two effects suggests that workers share in the tax (reduction) through wage bargaining but bear thereby no more than a fourth of the CIT burden.
In the long run, capital is likely to be adjusted to a change in its user costs. Based on the estimates in column (2) of Table 5 and following the same incidence calculation as above, the results indicate that direct CIT incidence is 0.19, that is, wage bargaining after an exogenous decrease of €1 in the CIT burden would increase the corporate wage bill by 19 cents in the long run. To sum up, workers share in reductions of the CIT burdenyet, direct incidence is small and confined to 0.19-0.28.
What is the total effect of a cut in the statutory CIT rate on the number of employees? To answer this question, we consider a cut in the statutory CIT rate by 40% (as introduced by the Tax Relief Act) and calculate the change in the number of the employed that such a reduction in the statutory CIT rate would entail. To put the (negative) employment effect caused by wage bargaining into perspective, we also consider (positive) employment effects due to greater capital stock, 18 which are part of indirect incidence and not the focus of our study: CIT 17. The tax elasticity of the ATR is calculated as the average of [(ATR 1998 -ATR 2001 )/ATR 1998 ] g /[(s 1998s 2001 )/s 1998 ] g across all industry-region groups. 18. CIT cuts lead to greater capital stock as they also reduce the user cost of capital. In simulations, in which we take into account that the Tax Relief Act changed both tax rates and depreciation allowances, we find the elasticity of the user cost of capital towards the CIT rate (g UCC,s ) to equal 0.084. cuts might well spur employment due to a shift of the labour demand curve caused by greater capital stock. This shift of the labour demand curve may (over)compensate the unambiguously negative employment effect caused by the movement along the labour demand curve (related to direct incidence on which we focussed throughout the study). As shown in Table 7 , wage bargaining has the expected negative effect on employment as wage rates are set at inefficiently high levels (about À431 000 workers). On the other hand, an additional 493 000 workers are employed because of an increase in capital stock. In total, a 40% Notes: Elasticity of the corporate wage bill calculated as described in eq. (3). The incidence estimates indicate the €-change in the total wage bill caused by a change in the corporate tax burden by €1. Incidence estimates are based on pre-reform information from 1998. In 1998, the corporate gross wage bill was €318.33 bn. The CIT assessed at that time was €36.28 bn. Tax incidence is calculated by relating the increase in the corporate wage bill caused by a 1% reduction in the statutory tax rate to the respective decrease in the amount of CIT assessed. We follow the convention in the literature and define tax incidence as a positive number if the reduction in CIT assessed leads to an increase in the corporate wage bill. For example, total direct incidence with fixed capital is given by -[(-0.01)* (-0.032)* €318.33 bn.]/[(À0.01)* €36.28 bn.] = 0.28. Heteroscedasticity-consistent robust (Huber-White) standard errors are reported in parentheses. a Calculation based on estimates from Tables 4 and 5 . Information on the corporate gross wage bill is from the National Income and Expenditure Survey, the value added tax statistics and the German Business Register. Aggregated CIT assessed is from the CIT statistics from the year 1998. reduction in the statutory CIT rate leads to a net increase in employment (+ 62 005), which is in accordance with conventional wisdom. 19 Next, we turn back to direct incidence and focus on our second measure of direct CIT incidence which is obtained under the assumption of constant employment. Such a measure of CIT incidence was used in prior literature. We use the baseline wage rate specification without employment (Table 4 , column (2) and g L d ;w 0) to calculate the tax elasticity of the corporate wage bill, based on eq. (3). Both the elasticity and the incidence estimates are presented in the last rows of Table 6 . Assuming employment to be constant generates estimates of the tax elasticity of the corporate wage bill of -0.062 and of CIT incidence of 0.547; that is, a reduction in the CIT worth €1 would increase the corporate wage bill by 55 cents. This estimate is surprisingly similar to the results that Arulampalam et al. (2012) obtained on a very different dataset. Neglecting potential employment responses, they estimate that direct corporate incidence is between 0.64 (short run) and 0.49 (long run). A similar estimate for the direct wage incidence of the German local business tax is obtained by Fuest et al. (2016) , who estimate a €1 increase in the tax burden to lower wages by 56 cents. Comparing these Notes: The employment response to a 40% reduction in the statutory CIT rate is calculated as ðÀ0:40Þg L;w g w;ATR g ATR;s N, where N is the number of the employed (15,375,204 individuals) . The taxrelated change in full-time equivalents through wage bargaining (with capital fixed) is then given by (À0.40)*(À0.586)*(À0.235)*0.324*15,375,204 = 274,405. A reduction in the statutory CIT rate by 1% reduces the user cost of capital by 0.084% (g UCC,s = 0.084). The employment response through greater capital stock is given by [(À0.40)g L,UCC g UCC,s N] or À0.40*(À0.954)*(0.084)*15,375,204 = 492,843. a Calculation based on estimates from 19. Note that the user cost of capital might not only directly affect labour demanded but also wage rates paid. In a robustness check we therefore added the user cost of capital as an explanatory variable to the wage estimation from column (8) of Table 4 . To account for endogeneity of the user cost of capital variable we used its fourth lag as an instrument. Results are unchanged (semi-elasticity of the wage rate with respect to the ATR of À2.068, corresponding tax elasticity of the wage rate of À0.238).
estimates obtained under the assumption of that employment remains constant to our preferred estimates discussed earlier shows that merely focussing on wages leads to an overestimation of direct tax incidence.
CONCLUSION
Taxes on corporate income impact the average quasi-rent in an industry and the industry's wage bill. Wages being partly determined by workers sharing in quasirents leads to direct incidence: given pretax profits, a lower tax burden directly increases the after tax quasi-rent over which firms and workers can bargain. Wage bargaining thus introduces a direct channel by which taxation affects the burden borne by labour. This paper contributes to the small literature on direct incidence. Particularly, we empirically investigate the size of direct corporate income tax incidence, taking employment effects into account for the first time. Negative employment effects arise if worker representatives have a strong preference for higher wages while bargaining, rather than for employment. Then, the increase in wage rate, negotiated after a tax cut, is too large. In a right-to-manage setting, such undue increase in wage rates leads to lower levels of employment: 20 While wage rates are subject to negotiation, firms retain the right to hire and fire thereafter. As we show in this paper, the right-to-manage model fits the German case during our observation period fairly well. Employment responses are thus expected to be an important determinant of the overall wage bargaining outcome. We estimate direct incidence using an industry-region level panel dataset covering all corporations in Germany in 1998-2006. Identification comes from two major tax reforms, which introduce exogenous variation in the change of the corporate income tax burden across industries in our observation period.
Our results show that it is crucial to take into account wage-related employment effects when calculating direct incidence. We find that workers share in reductions of the CIT burdenyet, direct incidence is small and confined to 0.19-0.28. That is, the net effect of wage bargaining on the corporate wage bill, after an exogenous €1 decrease in the CIT burden, is as little as 19-28 cents. This is about half of the effect obtained in prior literature under the assumption that employment remained constant. Reproducing these estimates and comparing direct incidence with and without employment responses confirms that a mere focus on wages leads to an overestimation of direct tax incidence.
In this paper, we investigated how tax-related wage bargaining affected the corporate wage bill (an aggregate measure of labour market outcomes). Necessarily, the aggregate measure clouds its very heterogeneous effects on individual workers: some receiving higher wage rates, others being laid off. It is left for future research to analyse the distributional effects brought about by taxrelated wage bargaining. 20. Calculating the overall employment effect of a cut in the statutory CIT rate shows that a tax reduction leads to a net increase of employment: the tax cut fosters capital stock and output and thereby enhances employment more strongly than employment is impaired by wage bargaining.
